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Abstract: Predation attracts a relatively high portion of labor in developing countries and
obstructs development. Agriculture also has an important weight in employment in these
countries. We formulate a model in which agents devote time either to predation or to
producing agricultural and manufactured goods with the following features: a subsistence
level of agricultural goods must be reached and, consequently, poor countries devote more
resources to agriculture; agriculture is more land intensive and, thus, has a lower labor
share than manufacturing; and incentives to devote time to production increase with the
labor share. The share of manufactured goods in GDP increases throughout the transition,
raising the labor share, which discourages predation and fosters production. This mechanism
involves an amplification eﬀect of the diﬀerences in productivity among countries due to the
reallocation of labor from predation to production. Institutional quality plays a crucial role
in this process, since it discourages predation.
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Trade (DEGIT-XVI) held in the SPbU Saint Petersburg for their helpful comments. We specially thank
José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, Alberto Bucci, Jakub Growiec and David Mayer-Foulkes. Both authors are members
of CAERP and they wish to acknowledge the support and stimulating environment of this centre.
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I. Introduction
Many developing countries fail to achieve a successful development process (see Quah 1996,
1997 and Parente and Prescott, 1993). Much eﬀort in current macroeconomic research
has been devoted to explaining this fact. In particular, new features, such as the nature
and composition of the economic activities have been explored. It is well known that in
economies, resources are devoted to both productive activities (production of goods and
services) and unproductive activities. Unproductive activities entail a group of activities
that share the common feature of being profitable, but wasteful: they use resources to
generate rents (i.e., income) but not goods (for example, property crime, fraud, begging,
lobbying, rent-seeking, etc.). We will call all these unproductive activities predation from
now on. Empirical evidence suggests that the size of the unproductive sector is larger in
low income countries. For example, the share of the criminal predatory sector in GDP is
20.7% for Latin America, while it is 6.89% for the United States2. Another example in the
literature is from Bourguignon (1999), who finds that the share of property crime in GDP
is 0.5% for United States, while it is 1.5% for Latin America.
It is widely accepted that the size of the agricultural sector in developing countries is
larger than in developed countries. Development literature characterizes the “food problem”
as the stage in which a country must first be able to satisfy its own subsistence needs before
the transition to economic growth can start to take oﬀ. Once the “food problem” is solved, a
structural change takes place in which agriculture loses weight throughout the development
process.
2These numbers are calculated using the studies of Anderson (1999) and Londoño and Guerrero (1998).
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Many recent studies have found agriculture to be less labor intensive than both industry
and services while the capital intensity is similar for all sectors (see Herrendorf and Valentinyi,
2008; and Echevarria, 1999). Thus, since the portion of resources devoted to agriculture is
larger in developing countries and labor share in agriculture is smaller than in other sectors, it
is reasonable to assume that labor share in developing countries is smaller than in developed
countries.
In this respect the relationship between labor share and development has received a lot
of attention recently. National accounts’ statistics typically reveal that labor share is smaller
in low income countries. However, Gollin (2002) pointed out that national account labor
shares are underestimated, since self-employed incomes are computed as capital income. This
problem is particularly severe for developing countries, where the portion of self-employed in
the labor force is quite high. Gollin proposed a set of adjustments to conventional calculations
which consist of including some part of self-employment income in labor share. Gollin’s
preferred adjustment is based on the assumption that the labor income of self-employed is
equal to the average wage of employees. The literature on self-employment in developing
countries shows that, typically, self-employed workers in developing countries are poor, with
low levels of education and with most of them working in the informal sector in small scale
businesses, which require low skills (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Mel et al., 2008; Temkin, 2009;
Narita, 2011). Thus, the adjustment proposed by Gollin has an upward bias for developing
countries since the shadow wage of the self-employed is below that of the employees’ wage
(as Maarek, 2010, pointed out and the above empirical literature confirms). In addition,
since most self-employed in developing countries are engaged in the informal economy, it is
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likely that part of their production is not accounted for in the GDP (the denominator of the
labor share). In spite of this upward bias in the labor share of developing countries, it still
remains lower than in developed countries after the adjustment proposed by Gollin. More
precisely, the average labor share of developing countries reported by Gollin is 0.584, while
the average in developed countries is 0.6873. One obvious limitation in Gollin’s analysis
is the small data set used in which developing countries are under-represented. Harrison
(2005) using a similar methodology, but with a much larger data set with respect to both
the number of countries and number of years, confirms that there are significant diﬀerences in
labor share between developing and developed countries, with developing countries displaying
lower shares. Another approach is to use industrial data. This approach has the advantage
that the weight of the self-employment in the sample is negligible or insignificant. Results
show that using such an approach, there exists a clear and positive relationship between
labor share and development indicators, such as per capita income (Ortega and Rodriguez,
2006) or capital accumulation (Decreuse and Maarek, 2009; and Maarek, 2010). Thus, all the
three empirical methodologies: conventional national account calculation; adjusted national
account calculation to incorporate self-employed; and the industrial data approach confirm
that developing countries exhibit lower labor shares than developed ones.
This paper introduces a mechanism that connects the empirical facts mentioned above.
3To calculate these averages, we consider developing countries to be those in which the per capita GDP
reported by Gollin was smaller than US $ 6,000 (1985 as basis year) and developed countries as those
above this threshold (GDPs reported by Gollin were mostly from 1992 with 1985 being the basis year).
This classification coincides with the one used by the IMF and the World Bank (the World Bank uses
the terminology low and middle income countries for developing countries and high income countries for
developed ones).
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To do this, the paper presents a three sector neoclassical growth model in which workers
devote time to producing agricultural and manufactured goods and to predation. As agri-
cultural goods satisfy primary necessities, a “food problem” arises: a subsistence level of
agricultural goods is required before the consumption of manufactured goods take place.
Thus, low income countries devote a higher proportion of their resources to agriculture than
high income countries. Moreover, the agricultural sector is more land intensive than the
manufacturing one, and this implies that the agricultural sector shows a lower labor share
than the manufacturing sector. These two features together, the higher weight of agriculture
in the production of low income countries and the lower labor share in agriculture imply
that the aggregate labor share is lower in poor countries than in rich countries. Low labor
shares imply low rewards for work relative to predation, discouraging work in productive
activities and stimulating predation. Thus, low income countries are characterized by a high
weight of agriculture in production, low labor share and high predation. However, the fact
that there is more predation in countries with low per capita capital does not overcome the
diminishing returns of capital, which implies a higher return on savings in countries with
low levels of per capita capital. Thus, there are incentives to save and accumulate capital
when the per capita capital is below the steady state level. As the country accumulates
capital and subsistence needs lose weight in households’ budgets, more resources are devoted
to producing manufactured goods. This reallocation of factors implies a rise in the weight
of the manufacturing sector, which gives rise to an increasing aggregate labor share during
the transition to the steady state. This increase in labor share raises the relative reward of
working in productive activities, thus encouraging the reallocation of labor from predation
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to production. Summarizing, a structural change occurs throughout the transition from an
initial per capita capital lower than the steady state level during which predation falls and
the weight of agriculture declines in favor of manufacturing.
This paper also oﬀers a new explanation to understand why diﬀerences in per capita
income among countries have persisted. Conventional wisdom says that diﬀerences in TFP
are one of the main sources of diﬀerences in per capita income4. This paper proposes a
mechanism that amplifies diﬀerences in TFP and per capita income generated by technolog-
ical diﬀerences across countries. This mechanism involves the reallocation of resources from
predation to productive activities and the incentives to engage in these activities. In this
sense, the mechanism is in line with the empirical research that emphasizes the diﬀerences in
“social infrastructure”, using the terminology by Hall and Jones (1999), to understand diﬀer-
ences in TFP across countries, instead of the more conventional view, which considers these
diﬀerences as mere technological ones. The mechanism works as follows: when productivity
(in manufacturing or agriculture) rises, there is a positive direct eﬀect on production and
an indirect eﬀect due to the accumulation of capital (the rise in productivity increases the
return on savings and so, the incentives to accumulate more capital). Together with these
standard mechanisms, in the current model there is another additional mechanism which
amplifies the eﬀect of productivity on per capita income. This new mechanism is related to
predation and the change in the sectorial composition so that when productivity rises, the
per capita capital rises and resources are reallocated from agriculture to manufacturing. The
larger the relative size of the manufacturing sector, the greater the aggregate labor share,
reducing the incentive to predate and increasing the portion of labor devoted to production
4See Easterly and Levine (2001), Hall and Jones (1999), and Parente and Prescott (2000).
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(agriculture and manufacturing). This increase in the amount of labor devoted to production
has three positive eﬀects on the per capita income: ) a direct eﬀect on per capita production;
) an indirect eﬀect due to the accumulation of capital: when labor rises, it increases both
the marginal productivity of capital and the incentive to accumulate more capital and ) a
reduction in the portion of labor devoted to predation implies that the share of the marginal
product of capital that goes to savers grows, raising the return on savings and promoting
the accumulation of capital.
This paper also analyzes the role of institutional quality. We show that institutional
quality is a crucial factor for development. In particular, we find that an improvement in the
institutional quality reduces the productivity of predation, generating a labor reallocation
from predation to productive activities which produces the same three positive eﬀects on per
capita income, as described above.
A feedback mechanism arises in our model in which predation aﬀects capital accumu-
lation, reducing the return on savings and damping capital accumulation and, at the same
time, capital accumulation aﬀects predation by expanding the manufacturing sector and the
labor share, which, in turn, discourages predation. The link between labor share and pre-
dation has been analyzed already in previous contributions by Zuleta (2004) and Andonova
and Zuleta (2009). However, labor share in these papers is constant and, consequently, the
capital accumulation does not aﬀect it and there is no feedback process. Furthermore, this
process takes place throughout the transition to the steady state, which is the focus of our
paper. However, this is not analyzed in previous contributions, which are centered on the
steady state (Zuleta, 2004) or propose static models (Andonova and Zuleta, 2009).
7
There is a large amount of literature devoted to the allocation of labor to productive and
unproductive activities (see for example, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993, Acemoglu,
1995, Schrag and Scotchmer, 1993, Grossman and Kim, 2002 and Chassang and Padró-i-
Miquel, 2010). However, this literature does not deal with the interaction between predation
and labor share. Moreover, are also a considerable number of papers on structural transfor-
mation which analyze the process of industrialization (see for example Restuccia, Yang and
Zhu, 2008, Gollin, Parente and Rogerson, 2002, 2004, 2007, and Córdoba and Ripoll, 2009),
though they do not deal with predation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of three sectors: agri-
culture, manufacturing and predation. Section 3 analyzes agents’ decisions and section 4
defines the equilibrium. Section 5 explains how the labor share and predation evolve with
the per capita capital level. Section 6 presents the dynamic behavior of the economy. Sec-
tion 7 analyzes how predation amplifies diﬀerences in productivity across countries and the
role of institutions. The last section, section 8, concludes and appendix presents proofs and
technical details.
II. The model
Time is continuous with an infinite horizon. The economy is populated with many identical
dynasties of homogeneous agents. There are two diﬀerent goods in the economy: agricultural
and manufactured goods, denoted by subindexes  and  respectively. Agricultural goods
are used only for consumption, while manufactured goods are used for consumption and
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investment in physical capital:
() = () +
() + () (1)
where () denotes the aggregate production in manufacturing, () denotes the aggre-
gate consumption in manufacturing, () denotes aggregate capital and  ∈ (0 1) denotes
depreciation rate.
() + () is the gross investment.
A. Technology
Production technologies of agricultural and manufactured goods are given by the following
production functions:
() = Γ (()) (()) (())1−− (2)
() = Γ (()) (())1− (3)
where () and () denote, respectively, the physical capital used in agriculture and
manufacturing; () and () the amount of labor used in agriculture and manufacturing,
and () denotes the amount of land used in agriculture. In order to capture the fact that
agriculture is more land intensive than manufacturing, we have used the extreme but simple
assumption that only agriculture uses land. Technologies also reflect the fact that the labor
share of the agricultural sector is smaller than the labor share of manufacturing.
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B. Preferences
There are many identical dynasties with “infinite life”. To simplify, we assume that popula-
tion is constant. Preferences of a dynasty are given by the following function:
Z ∞





() if () ≤ 
+ () if () ≥ 
where () and () denote, respectively, the per capita consumption of dynasty of agri-
cultural and manufactured goods in period , and   0 is the discount rate of the utility
function. Thus, these preferences imply a “food problem”: households do not consume man-
ufactured goods until reaching a certain “subsistence” level of consumption of agricultural
goods, denoted by .
C. The predation technology
Each period, agents are endowed with  units of land and one unit of time, which can be
devoted to undertaking two types of economic activities: to produce goods  and to commit
predation , that is,
1 = () + () (4)
We consider that predation activities are all activities which imply use of resources to obtain
incomes without generating production. We include property crimes, fraud, corruption,
lobbying, etc. The amount of income obtained through predation is denoted by e() (),
where e() is the per capita production and  : <+ → [0 1] is the fraction of per capita
gross production that each agent predates, which depends positively on the amount of time
devoted to such activity, . We assume that the function () is strictly increasing, strictly
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concave, continuous and diﬀerentiable of the second order and (0) = 0, (1)  1 and
0(0) ≥ 1.
III. Agents’ decisions
We will concentrate on the case in which consumption is above subsistence level and therefore
consumption of manufactured good is positive.
A. Households:







() = ()()+()()+()-(e())()| {z }
Net income from production
+ (())e()| {z }
Predation income
-()-()
() + () = 1
() = ()() + ( + ())() + ()
where () denotes the amount of assets of the household, () the wage per unit of labor, ()
the net return on assets, () the renting price of land, () the household’s gross income
and () the price of agricultural goods in terms of manufactured goods. We normalize the
price of manufactured goods to one. Since () is the net return on assets,  + () is the
gross interest rate, which is the one that appears in the definition of gross income. The sign
“e” over a variable means that such variable is a per capita variable of the economy and
therefore, the household cannot decide on it. Thus, e denotes per capita labor devoted to
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predation and e the per capita gross income. Income coming from the production sector
is equal to labor income from the production sector ()() plus financial income ()(),
plus land rents (), minus the amount of this income that is predated by other agents in
the economy (e())(). The other source of income comes from the predation sector which
is equal to (())e(). It is quite obvious from the preferences definition that when an agent
enjoys a consumption level above the subsistence consumption level, she is going to consume
the subsistence level of agricultural goods . Thus, the total expenditure in consumption is
equal to the expenditure in agricultural goods, (), plus the expenditure in consumption
of manufactured goods (). The increase of the household’s assets,
(), is equal to its
savings, which is equal to its income (the one from production plus the one from predation)
minus the expenditure in consumption goods, () + ().
The first order conditions for the interior solution are as follows:
()
h
1− (e())i = 0(())e() (6)
()
() = (() + )
³
1− (e())´−  −  (7)
Equation 6 specifies that the net wage in the production sector after predation should be
equal to the marginal payment of predation activities. That is, the marginal payment of the
time devoted to each activity should be equal. Equation (7) is the typical Euler equation.
The speed at which consumption grows depends positively on the return on savings, (() +
)
³
1− (e())´−  and negatively on the discount rate of the household, .









 −  −  − ( + )
 : Γ  1−− ≥ 
(8)
max
 −  − ( + )
 : Γ1− ≥ 
(9)




 =  (10)
Γ
 1−−
 = ( + ) (11)
Γ
 1−−
 =  (12)
(1− )Γ
1−
 =  (13)
Γ
1−
 = ( + ) (14)
These conditions are well known and indicate that firms hire a factor until reaching the
point at which the marginal productivity of the factor is equal to its price. The per capita
production of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are:
 = Γ 1−− (15)
 = Γ1− (16)
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IV. Equilibrium Definition
The definition of equilibrium is standard: equilibrium occurs when agents maximize their
objective functions and markets clear. Steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which
both the allocation and prices always remain constant over time.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is an allocation {() () () () () () ()
() () () () ()e() e()o∞=0 and a vector of prices {() () () ()}∞=0
such that ∀ the following conditions hold:
• Households maximize their utility, that is, {() () () ()}∞=0 is the solution of
the household’s maximization problem (5) and () = .
• Firms maximize profits, that is, ∀ (), (), (), () and (), (), () are
the solution of the optimization problem of firms (8) and (9).
• Capital market clears: ∀ () + () = () = ().
• Labor market clears: ∀ () + () = ().
• Land market clears: ∀ () = .
• Good Market clears:  = (), () +
() + () = ().
• Finally, since households are identical, per capita variables coincide with household
variables: ∀ e() = () and e() = ()() + ( + ())() + ().
Definition 2 Steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both the allocation and
prices always remain constant over time.
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V. Predation and per capita capital
A. Labor share
We define the labor share,  in the productive sector as the fraction of labor income over
the value of the production:
 =  =
 + 
 + 
We denote the portion of productive labor devoted to agriculture by  ≡ .
Lemma 3 Labor share is a decreasing function of the portion of productive labor devoted to
agriculture, .
Labor share in the economy is a weighted average of the labor share in the manufacturing
and agricultural sectors, where the weight of each sector is equal to the portion of the value
of production that each sector has in the aggregate GDP. If a higher portion of productive
labor is devoted to agriculture, then a higher portion of GDP comes from the agricultural
sector, and this reduces labor share.
Lemma 4 The portion of labor devoted to predation, , is a strictly decreasing function of
labor share, with  = 1 when  = 0 and  = min ≤ 1 when  = 1.
Thus, a higher labor share increases the relative reward for work with respect to predating,
which encourages work in productive activities and discourages predation.
B. Labor devoted to predation and per capita capital
Proposition 5 The portion of labor devoted to agriculture at equilibrium, , and the por-
tion of labor devoted to predation at equilibrium,  are strictly decreasing functions of , Γ
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and , and a strictly increasing functions of . The portion of labor devoted to production
at equilibrium,  is a strictly increasing function of , Γ and , and a strictly decreasing
function of .
Households’ preferences imply that households do not consume manufactured goods until
reaching a certain “subsistence” level of consumption of agricultural goods, . When the
resources of the economy (per capita capital or land) expand or agricultural technology
improves, then more resources, including labor, become available and may be devoted to
the manufacturing sector. This increases labor share, discouraging predation and fostering
work in productive activities. Exactly the opposite eﬀects occur if the subsistence level of
consumption goes down.
From now on, we will denote by () and () and () the functions that relate,
respectively, to the amount of labor devoted to predation, the amount of labor devoted to
production and the portion of productive labor devoted to agriculture in equilibrium with
the per capita capital, .
VI. Dynamic Behavior
The dynamic system that defines the dynamic behavior of the economy is as follows:
() =  (())− ()− ()
()
() = ( (()) + ) (1−  ( (())))−  − 
where  () is the function that relates per capita production of the manufacturing sector
with per capita capital at equilibrium. This function takes into account the fact that, at
equilibrium, some of the resources of the economy are devoted to the production of agriculture
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and others to predation.  (()) is the function that relates the interest rate at equilibrium
to per capita capital. These two functions are defined in the appendix.
Lemma 6 The production of the manufacturing sector at equilibrium is a strictly increasing
function of the capital:  : [min 0] → <+. The net interest rate  (()) is a strictly
decreasing function of the capital. If   (1−) then the gross interest rate after predation
( (()) + ) (1−  ( (()))) is a strictly decreasing function of the capital.
The above lemma states that the net interest rate that savers receive (after predation) is
a decreasing function of per capita capital.
Lemma 7 Ω ∈ <++ exists so that if Γ  Ω then, max  min  0 exists so that
 +  ¡min¢   and when  ∈ ¡min max¢ then  ()   .
The above lemma establishes a suﬃcient condition to guarantee the existence of a steady
state in which the consumption of manufactured goods is positive. We assume that Γ  Ω
Lemma 6 and 7 imply that the net interest rate equalizes the discount rate of the utility
just once. Therefore, there is a unique steady state with a positive amount of manufactured
goods.
Corollary 8 If   (1 − ) there is a unique steady state with a positive amount of
consumption of manufactured goods.
We will concentrate our analysis on the case in which there is a unique steady state with
a positive amount of consumption of manufactured goods. Thus, we assume   (1− ).
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Phase diagram in figure 1 shows that the dynamic behavior of the economy is charac-
terized by the typical saddle point dynamic5: there is a unique path which converges to the
steady state. This means that, given the initial level of per capita capital, there is a unique
equilibrium path, which converges to the steady state. When the initial amount of per capita
capital is lower than the steady state level, the consumption and the portion of labor devoted
to production grow throughout the equilibrium path, converging to their steady state levels,
while the amount of labor devoted to predation goes down. When the amount of per capita
capital is larger than the steady state level the opposite happens. Thus, when the starting
per capita capital is below the steady state level, there is a “structural change” throughout
the transition: there is a reallocation of labor from agricultural and predation sectors to the
manufacturing sector, as documented in the empirical literature.
VII. Predation as an amplification mechanism and the role of institutions
A. The eﬀect of an improvement in the technology of the agricultural sector
Phase diagram in figure 2 displays the dynamic eﬀect of an improvement in the technology of
the agricultural sector, Γ. When there is an improvement in the technology of this sector, Γ,
producing the subsistence level of consumption requires fewer resources. As a consequence,
part of the capital and labor devoted to producing the subsistence level of consumption in
the agricultural sector flows to the manufacturing sector, increasing the amount of resources
devoted to it. Furthermore, there is an amplification eﬀect due to predation: when the
amount of resources devoted to the agricultural sector falls, the labor share of the economy
5See appendix for technical details.
18
rises and this encourages the use of labor for productive activities, increasing further the
production of the manufacturing sector. This amplification eﬀect involves a rise in the
return on savings, due to the fact that the fall in predation has a direct positive eﬀect on the
portion of the return on capital that goes to savers, encouraging capital accumulation and
moving the
 locus to the right. The increase in the production of the manufacturing sector
is reflected in the movement of the
 locus, which goes up. As a consequence, the economy
moves towards the new steady state with a higher level of capital, a lower portion of labor
devoted to predation and a higher portion of labor and capital devoted to manufacturing.
Throughout the transition there is a “structural change”: there is a flow of labor from
agricultural and predation sectors to the manufacturing sector.
B. The eﬀect of an improvement in the technology of the manufacturing sector
The eﬀect of an improvement in the technology in the manufacturing sector, Γ, is similar
to the improvement in the technology of the agricultural sector. In fact, we can use the
same phase diagram in figure 2 to display the dynamic eﬀect that such technological change
has. When there is an improvement in the technology of the manufacturing sector, the
production and the marginal productivity of capital in this sector rise. As a consequence,
the
 locus goes up and the  locus moves to the right. The economy goes towards a new
steady state with a higher level of capital, a lower portion of labor devoted to predation and
a higher portion of labor and capital devoted to the manufacturing sector. Throughout the
transition there is also an amplification eﬀect due to the fall in predation: when per capita
capital goes up, the portion of labor that goes to agriculture goes down, increasing the labor
share and reducing the amount of labor devoted to predation. This reduction in predation
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and the increase in productive labor amplify the eﬀect of technological change on capital
accumulation. Furthermore, the fall in predation has a direct positive eﬀect on the portion
of the return on capital that goes to savers, encouraging additional capital accumulation.
C. The role of institutions
To analyze the role of institutions in the model we make a straightforward extension. We
introduce a parameter, , in the predation technology which reduces the productivity of
predation, and we interpret such parameter as an index of institutional quality. To be
more precise, consider that the amount of income obtained through predation is equal to
 ( ) e(), with ( ) having the same properties defined above but now () is a strictly
decreasing function of , the index of institutional quality. Thus, the eﬀect of an improvement
in institutional quality, , is similar to the improvement in technology analyzed above and
displayed in phase diagram in figure 2, but with a jump down in predation and a jump up in
productive labor at the moment of change in  in the bottom part of the figure. The economy
goes towards the new steady state with a higher level of capital, a lower portion of labor
devoted to predation and a higher portion of labor and capital devoted to the manufacturing
sector.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper presents a neoclassical growth model with predation in which firms produce
agricultural and manufactured goods. Due to the fact that agriculture is more land intensive
than manufacturing, the labor share in agriculture is lower than in manufacturing. A country
faces the typical “food problem”, it has to satisfy first its subsistence needs of agricultural
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goods before starting to consume manufactured goods. As the country accumulates capital
and subsistence needs begin to be satisfied, resources are devoted to manufacturing. This
reallocation of factors implies that (aggregate) labor share rises during the transition when
the initial per capita capital is lower than the steady state level. This increase in labor share
implies a reduction in incentives to predate and a reallocation of labor from predation to
production. Thus, this paper not only analyzes how predation aﬀects capital accumulation
but also how capital accumulation aﬀects predation and the resulting feedback process.
This paper proposes a mechanism that amplifies the diﬀerences in per capita income
generated by diﬀerences in productivity that shed some light on understanding diﬀerences
across countries in per capita income. When productivity rises, there is a direct standard
eﬀect on production and an indirect standard eﬀect due to the accumulation of capital: the
rise in productivity increases the return on savings and thus, the incentives to accumulate
more capital. However, in our model, there is an additional mechanism related to the
reallocation of resources across sectors and the reduction in predation: when productivity
rises, the per capita capital rises, generating a reallocation of resources from agriculture to
manufacturing and so, an increase in labor share, which reduces the incentive for predation
and increases the portion of labor devoted to production. This increase in the amount of
labor devoted to production has three eﬀects: ) a direct eﬀect on per capita production;
) an indirect eﬀect due to the accumulation of capital: when labor rises, it increases the
marginal productivity of capital and thus, the incentive to accumulate more capital; )
finally, the reduction in the portion of labor devoted to predation implies that the share of
the marginal product of capital that goes to savers increases, raising the return on savings
21
and promoting further the accumulation of capital.
Finally, we analyzed the role of institutional quality, which discourages predation and,
consequently, is also crucial for the reallocation of labor to productive activities and thus for
the development process as a whole.
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Figure 1: Dynamic behavior
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Figure 2: Dynamic eﬀect of an improvement in the agricultural technology
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X. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
The labor share in the productive sector is a decreasing function of the portion of pro-
ductive labor devoted to agriculture:
 =  =








(1− )(1− − )
(1− )  + (1− − ) 
 = (1− )(1− − )
(1− ) + (1− − )(1− ) =
(1− )(1− − )
(1− − ) +  (17)
where  ≡  is the portion of productive labor used in agriculture. We used in the second
equality equations (10), (13), (15) and (16).
Using equation (6) and the fact that all household are identical (e = ), it follows that:
() = 
0()(1− )
[1− ()] =  (18)
where  : [0 1]→ <+ is defined as () = 0()(1−)1−() .
We will need the following result in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 9 There is a unique min ∈ [0 1) such that  ()  1 when   min , 
¡min ¢ = 1
and () is strictly decreasing in £min  1¤. Furthermore,  (1) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 9
It was assumed that (1)  1 which implies:
(1) = 
0(1)(1− 1)
[1− (1)] = 0 (19)
By assumption 0(0) ≥ 1 and (0) = 0, which imply:
(0) = 
0(0)(1− 0)
[1− (0)] = 
0(0) ≥ 1 (20)
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Note that if   1 and () ≤ 1 then




[1−()]  0 (21)
It follows from equations (19) and (20) and the fact that () is continuous and strictly
decreasing when () ≤ 1 (see equation 21) that there is a unique min ∈ [0 1), such that
 ¡min ¢ = 1, being min = 0 when 0(0) = 1. Furthermore, it follows from equation (19) and
definition of min , that 
¡min ¢  1 when   min . Finally, it follows from equation (21) and
definition of min that 
¡min ¢ is strictly decreasing when  ∈ £min  1¤.
Proof of Proposition 5
We will prove a lemma before proving proposition 5.


















(1− ) = −
”()(1− )
0() + 1 + ()  1 + 
where in the last inequality we used the assumption that () is concave.
The factors markets and agriculture goods clearing condition are the following:
 +  =  (22)
 +  =  (23)
 =  (24)
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Using (22), (23) and (25):
(1− − ) = (1− )
 − 
 −  ⇔
(1− − ) − (1− ) +  = (1− ) − (1− )
(1− − ) +  = (1− )
 = (1− )(1− − ) +  =
(1− )
(1− − ) +  (26)








(1− − ) + 
¶
1−− = Γ1−− (27)
Using (18), (17) and (5), it yields the following equation system:
(1− )− (1− )(1− − )
(1− − ) +  = 0 (28)µ
(1− )
(1− − ) + 
¶
1− 1−− −Φ = 0 (29)
where Φ ≡ Γ . Treating  and  as the endogenous variables and using the Implicit
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It follows from (14), (22), (23) and (26) that:
 =  −  = (1− − )(1− )(1− − ) +   (30)




(1− − ) + 
¸
(1− )1− (32)
 +  =  = Γ
∙






Thus, it follows from the above equation and the capital accumulation equation (1) and
Euler equation (7) that:
() =  (())− ()− ()
()





(1− − ) +  ()
¸
(1−  ())  [ ()]1− (34)
 () = Γ
∙
















 ( ()) (36)








Proof of Lemma 6
It follows straightforward from (36) that  is an increasing function of . It follows from
equation (37) that  is a decreasing function in  when  ≡  is a decreasing function of
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. To prove that, it is enough to prove that  is an increasing function of Φ ≡ Γ . We
may rewrite the equation system (28) and (29) as follows:
(1− )− (1− )(1− − )




1−− −Φ = 0












































































1− (1− − )





1− (1− − )
1− 
¸




   0
we used lemma 10 in the inequality.
















( () + ) =
(()+)
















































 − (1−)−0(1−) (1−−)+
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(1− − ) + 
⎤
⎦
where in the last inequality we have used equation (26) and the assumption that  
(1− )⇔ (1− )(1− ) =  +   . Thus:
 [( () + ) (1− (()))]
 =




Proof of Lemma 7
Let’s define  as the amount of labor at equilibrium if the labor share of the economy
were equal to the one in agriculture and  the amount of labor at equilibrium if the labor
share of the economy were equal to the one in manufacture:
 ⇔ () = 1− − 
 ⇔ () = 1− 
Obviously,  ∈ ¡ ¢. Let’s define  as the level of capital required to produce the subsistence
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level of consumption when  = ):




where  = Γ It follows from the definition of , (18) and (27) that:
 () = 1
Let’s define  such that growth of capital cannot be positive even if all the resources of
the economy are devoted to the manufactured sector (there is neither production in the
agriculture nor predation):





If    it is possible to define the following function:


























lim→0 () = lim→0 max∈[0]
()
































Thus, it follows form the Maximum and the Envelope Theorem that there is a unique 1 ∈³
0 ¡Γ ¢ 1− 1−−´ such that  (1) =  and ∀  1  (1)  . Thus, if   1it is
possible to definemin and max such that:
min ⇔ 0 = 
¡min¢− min ⇔  ¡min¢ = min (38)
max ⇔ max = min
½
 ∈ £min ¤ s.th. () = ¾ (39)
It follows from (27), (35) and (38) that:





¡min¢ = lim→0 () =
lim→0Γ
∙









−  = +∞
If  ¡min¢ ≥ +  when  = 1, then Ω = 1. If  ¡min¢  +  when  = 1, then, there
is 2 such that if  = 2 then (min) = + . Thus, in this case Ω = 2.
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